2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians
Is Oscar-minus a dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response to Chrysippus’ paradox was preciso claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not a dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is per dog, then, given the standard account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Per fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is a proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus a hair – which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.
There are then at least 101 dogs (and in fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply puro avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar macchia. But the maximality principle may seem puro be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark mediante unison? If per thing is per dog, shouldn’t it be breviligne of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested verso reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (in various different ways) from one another and Oscar by per hair, as dogs, and durante fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is per Dalmatian).
Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still in place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later puro become definitely Dalmatians; some sopra a day, some sopra verso second, or per split second. It seems arbitrary preciso proclaim per Dalmatian part that is a split second away from becoming definitely per Dalmatian, a Dalmatian, while denying that one a day away is per Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems esatto favor one of the latter type according esatto which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Sopra any case, the canone account of identity seems unable on its own puro handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.
It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus a hair is per dog – and a Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is verso multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark in unison giammai more loudly than Oscar barks chiazza.
2.4 The Paradox of Constitution
Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases verso piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into verso ball and fashions a new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes verso part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using verso new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by verso new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical preciso \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical to \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical esatto) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By per similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical puro https://datingranking.net/it/down-dating-review/ both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the canone account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants con quantified modal logic are preciso be handled exactly as they are in first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced puro affirm that distinct physical objects ancora time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The norma account is thus prima facie incompatible with the natural pensiero that constitution is identity.